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Abstract
This paper empirically estimates the returns to membership of the Chinese Com-
munist Party using unique twins data that the authors collected from urban China.
Our ordinary least squares estimate shows that being a Party member increases earn-
ings by 28.1 percent, but when we use a within-twin-pair ﬁxed-eﬀects model, the eﬀect
of Party membership all but disappears, which suggests that much of the estimated
value of Party membership that is given in the literature is due to the eﬀects of omitted
ability or family background. The ﬁndings suggest that Party members fare well not
because of their special political status per se, but because of the superior ability that
allowed them to pass through the strict Party membership selection process.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J31; O15; P261 Introduction
There is growing interest among economists in measuring the value of political status or con-
nections in both developed and developing countries (Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Agrawal
and Knoeber, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2004; Bertrand et al., 2004; Khwaja
and Mian, 2004). In the context of China in particular, many economists and other social
scientists have attempted to measure the returns to being a member of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (Szelenyi, 1987; Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996; Rona-Tas, 1994; Walder, 1996; Morduch
and Sicular, 2000; Liu, 2003).1 Many studies have found that Party membership has had
a positive value for businesses or personal incomes during China’s economic transition, and
that Party members have quickly turned their political advantages into economic beneﬁts
by securing high-paying jobs in monopolistic state-owned enterprises or the government.
However, despite the accumulation of large quantities of evidence on the relationship
between Party membership and economic beneﬁts, no study has succeeded in establishing
causality. An ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the eﬀect of Party membership
on earnings cannot prove causality, because Party members may have high earnings due
to their greater ability or more advantageous family background. Thus, Party membership
may be correlated with the eﬀects of unobserved ability or family background, which would
make any correlation between membership and earnings spurious. Most studies of the re-
turns to Chinese Communist Party membership, and of the value of political connections
in general, give only limited information on individual characteristics, and thus unobserved
heterogeneity may confound any causal inference.
In this paper, we attempt to empirically measure the value of Chinese Communist
Party membership to an individual’s earnings. The main innovation of this paper is that we
control for the eﬀects of omitted ability and family background by using unique twins data
that two of the authors collected in urban China. As monozygotic (from the same egg) twins
1The Communist Party of China (CPC) was founded in 1921. Led by Mao Zedong, it won the Chinese
civil war and founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The CPC is now probably the largest party
in the world, with more than 70 million members.
1are genetically identical and have a similar family background, they should be subject to
similar eﬀects of unobserved ability or family background. Looking at the within-twin-pair
diﬀerence will to a great extent reduce the eﬀects of unobserved ability and family background
that have caused bias in the OLS estimation of the returns to Party membership in previous
studies. Intuitively, by contrasting the earnings of identical twins with and without Party
membership, we can be more conﬁdent that any correlation that we observe between Party
membership and earnings is not due to a correlation between Party membership and an
individual’s ability or family background.
Our empirical work shows that most of the eﬀects of Party membership are actually
due to the eﬀects of unobserved ability or family background. Our OLS estimates show
that being a Party member increases an individual’s earnings by 28.1 percent. Although
the estimated eﬀect of Party membership is reduced by more than half when we include
other measures of human capital, such as age, education, gender, and job tenure, it remains
statistically signiﬁcant and large in magnitude. Interestingly, once we use the within-twin-
pair ﬁxed-eﬀects model, the eﬀect of Party membership all but disappears, which suggests
that much of the estimated returns to Party membership as found by the OLS model is
due to the eﬀects of omitted ability or family background. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by
generalized least squares estimations that also include the co-twin’s Party membership as a
covariate.
The ﬁnding that most of the eﬀect of Party membership is due to unobserved ability
or family background is not surprising given the unique way in which the Party selects
its members.2 The selection process begins with an adult individual submitting a formal
application to a Party branch in their work unit to express their desire to become a member.
The applicant is then monitored for at least three years, during which time they must make
a continuous eﬀort to meet all of the Party standards. Each applicant is assigned two Party
member liaisons who monitor and assess the applicant’s political loyalty, work performance,
and social activities, and relationships with co-workers, neighbors, and other people on a
2See Bian et al. (2001) for the detailed selection mechanisms of the Party.
2regular basis. When the Party branch believes that it is time to make a more thorough
evaluation, usually about two years after application, it seeks opinions about the applicant
from co-workers who are not Party members and then has a closed-door evaluation meeting
that involves all of the Party members in the branch. Any serious doubt on the part of either
a non-Party co-worker or a Party member could mean failure, and the applicant will be given
time to improve before being considered for another closed-door evaluation. If the potential
candidate passes the closed-door evaluation, then they will become a probationary Party
member. Probationary Party members are then closely monitored by the Party branch for
another year before becoming formal Party members.
This lengthy and extended selection procedure not only ensures the political loyalty
of applicants, but also ensures the superior quality of Party members. To become a Party
member, an individual needs to show great ability by outperforming co-workers, good inter-
personal skills through the maintenance of good relations with co-workers, great persistence
by performing well throughout the long selection process, and a positive attitude toward
communist ideology, society, and work. Work ability, interpersonal skills, persistence, and a
positive attitude are important qualities for the success of an individual in both their social
life and their career. In fact, some sociologists (Szelenyi, 1987; Lin and Bian, 1991; Walder,
1995) view Party membership as a credential like educational qualiﬁcations.
Our further analysis suggests that the size of the earnings premium and the eﬀect of
unobserved factors diﬀer across generations. We ﬁnd that Party members on average enjoy
an earnings premium among both the young and the old, although it is larger for the older
generation. The earnings premium for the younger generation can be fully explained by the
observed human capital variables, such as age, tenure, and education. The earnings premium
for the older generation cannot be fully explained by such variables, but it can be explained
by unobserved ability. The diﬀerence in the eﬀect of unobserved ability may be due to the
interruption of the education of the older generation during the Cultural Revolution. More
importantly, it may also be due to the declining attractiveness of Party membership for
3the younger generation. Although the Communist Party still rules China, the communist
ideology and role of the Party and the government in the economy have weakened after more
than two and half decades of economic transition.
In addition to contributing to the growing body of literature on the value of Party
membership in China, our study also contributes to the general literature that measures the
value of political connections and political status. The most diﬃcult task in such research
is also to solve omitted variable bias. Because of the diﬃculty in directly measuring the
value of political connections, Roberts (1990) and Fisman (2001) have sought to measure it
indirectly by making use of special political events to solve the omitted variable bias. By
using a sample of twins, we provide a method of controlling for omitted variable bias and of
directly measuring the value of political status without the complication of omitted variable
bias.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the estimation methods
that draw on the twins data. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 empirically
measures the returns to Party membership, and Section 5 presents some sensitivity tests.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Method
Our empirical work focuses on the estimation of the log earnings equation that is given as
yi = Xiα + β1Pi + Ziβ2 + µi + i, (1)
where the subscript i refers to individual i, yi is the logarithm of earnings, Pi is the Party
membership dummy, and Xi is a set of observed family variables. Zi is a set of observed
individual variables that aﬀect earnings, and includes age, age squared, gender, job tenure,
and years of education. µi represents a set of unobservables that also aﬀect earnings, i.e.,
unobserved ability or family eﬀect. i is the disturbance term, which is assumed to be
independent of Zi and µi.
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the Party membership eﬀect in equation
4(1), β1, is generally biased. The bias arises because normally we do not have a perfect
measure of µi, which is very likely to be correlated with Pi. Intuitively, the cross-sectional
comparison of Party members to non-Party members will not identify the Party membership
eﬀect even if the two groups of workers are identical with respect to the observed variables.
This is because Party and non-Party members may diﬀer in other unobserved characteristics
that aﬀect income. As is discussed in the introduction, Party members may be more capable,
motivated, or blessed with advantageous family backgrounds, and if these advantages are
not completely accounted for then the Party membership dummy in the OLS estimations
will pick up the eﬀect of these variables. It is therefore diﬃcult to ascertain how much of the
empirical association between earnings and Party membership is due to the causal eﬀect of
Party membership and how much is due to unobserved factors that inﬂuence both earnings
and Party membership. The omitted variable bias depends on
cov(Pi,µi)
var(Pi) , which summarizes
the relationship in the sample between the excluded µi and the included Pi.
Several approaches can be taken to tackle the problem of omitted variable bias. The
ﬁrst approach is to seek richer datasets that can be used to control more extensively for
measures of ability, family background, and such like. The main problem with this approach
is that the controls inevitably remain incomplete, but nonetheless we have taken advantage
of our rich dataset and include many control variables in our estimations to reduce the
omitted variable bias.
A second approach is to apply the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator to our twins sample. As
monozygotic twins are genetically identical and have a similar family background, they
should have the same µi. Thus, taking the within-twin-pair diﬀerence will eliminate the
unobservable ability and family eﬀect µi that is the cause of the omitted variable bias in
the OLS estimation. Intuitively, by contrasting the earnings of identical twins with diﬀerent
Party membership status, we can ensure that any correlation that we observe between Party
membership and earnings is not due to a correlation between Party membership and a
worker’s ability or family background.
5The ﬁxed-eﬀects model can be speciﬁed as follows. The earnings equations of a pair of
twins are given as
y1i = Xiα + β1P1i + Z1iβ2 + µi + 1i (2)
y2i = Xiα + β1P2i + Z2iβ2 + µi + 2i, (3)
where yji (j = 1,2) is the logarithm of the earnings of the ﬁrst and second twin in the pair.
Xi is the set of observed variables that vary across families but not across twins, that is, the
family background variables. Pji (j = 1,2) is the Party membership dummy for twin j in
family i, and Zji (j = 1,2) is a set of variables that vary across the twins.
A within-twin-pair or ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator of β for identical twins, βfe is based on
the ﬁrst diﬀerence between equations (2) and (3):
y1i − y2i = β1(P1i − P2i) + (Z1i − Z2i)β2 + 1i − 2i. (4)
The ﬁrst diﬀerence removes both observable and unobservable family eﬀects, or Xi and µi.
As µi has been removed, we can apply the OLS method to Equation (4) without worrying
about bias being caused by the omitted ability and family background variables.
A third approach to solving the omitted variable bias is to directly estimate both the
bias and the Party eﬀect using the approach that was developed by Ashenfelter and Krueger
(1994). This approach also draws on data from monozygotic twins. In this approach, the
correlation between the unobserved family eﬀect and the observables is given as
µi = γP1i + γP2i + Z1iθ + Z2iθ + Xiδ + ωi, (5)
where we assume that the correlations between the family eﬀect µi and the Party status of
each twin Pji (j = 1,2) and the characteristics of each twin Zji (j = 1,2) are the same.
We further assume that ωi is uncorrelated with Pji (j = 1,2), Zji (j = 1,2) and Xi. The
coeﬃcient γ measures the selection eﬀect that relates family eﬀect to Party status, and
the vector of coeﬃcients θ measures the selection eﬀect that relates family eﬀect to other
individual characteristics.
6The reduced form for equations (2), (3), and (5) is obtained by substituting (5) into
(2) and (3) and collecting the terms as follows.
y1i = Xi(α + δ) + (β1 + γ)P1i + γP2i + Z1i(β2 + θ) + Z2iθ + 
0
1i (6)




ji = ωi+ji, (j = 1,2). Equations (6) and (7) are estimated using the generalized least
squares (GLS) method, which is the best estimator that allows cross-equation restrictions
on the coeﬃcients. Although both the ﬁxed-eﬀects and the GLS models control for ability
and can produce unbiased estimates of the Party eﬀect β1, GLS also allows the estimation
of the selection eﬀect γ.
3 Data
The data that we use are derived from the Chinese Twins Survey, which was carried out by
the Urban Survey Unit of the National Bureau of Statistics in June and July 2002 in ﬁve cities
in China. The survey was funded by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong. Based on
twins questionnaires from the United States and elsewhere, the survey covered a wide range
of socioeconomic information. The questionnaire was designed by two authors of this paper
in close consultation with Mark Rosenzweig and Chinese experts at the National Bureau of
Statistics. Adult twins who were aged between 18 and 65 (the 1942-1986 birth cohort) were
identiﬁed by the local Bureau of Statistics through various channels, including colleagues,
friends, relatives, newspaper advertising, neighborhood notices, neighborhood management
committees, and household records in the public security bureau. Overall, these channels
permit a roughly equal probability of contacting all of the twins in these cities, and thus the
twins sample that is obtained for this study is approximately representative. (The within-
twins estimation method that is used for this study controls for the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of
any unobserved characteristics that might have led to the selection of pairs of twins for
the sample.) The questionnaires were completed through household face-to-face personal
interviews. The survey was conducted with considerable care, and several site checks were
7made by Junsen Zhang and experts from the National Bureau of Statistics. After appropriate
discussion with Mark Rosenzweig and other experts, the data input was closely supervised
and monitored by Junsen Zhang himself in July and August 2002.
This is the ﬁrst socioeconomic dataset on twins in China and perhaps the ﬁrst in Asia.
The dataset includes detailed socioeconomic information on respondents from households
in ﬁve cities: Chengdu, Chongqing, Harbin, Hefei, and Wuhan. Altogether there are 4,683
observations, of which 3,012 are from households with twins. In the twins sample, we can
distinguish whether they are identical or non-identical twins. We consider a pair of twins
to be identical if both twins respond that they have identical hair color, look, gender, and
age. We have completed questionnaires from 3,002 individuals, of which 2,996 are twin
individuals and 6 are triplet individuals. Of these 3,002 individuals, we have 914 complete
pairs of identical twins (1,828 individuals), and complete information on earnings, Party
membership, education, and other variables for both twins in the pair is available for 435 of
these pairs (870 individuals).
For the purpose of comparison, non-twin households in the ﬁve cities were taken from
regular households with whom the Urban Survey Unit conducts regular monthly surveys
of their own. The Urban Survey Unit started regular monthly surveys in the 1980s. Their
initial samples were random and representative, and although they have made every eﬀort to
maintain these good sampling characteristics, their samples have become less representative
over time. In particular, given the increasingly high refusal rate of young people, the samples
have gradually become biased toward the oversampling of old people over time. The survey
of non-twin households was conducted at the same time as the twin survey using the same
questionnaire.
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Although our within-twin-pair esti-
mations control for possible sample selection, it is interesting to compare the identical twins
sample to the other samples that we have. To facilitate such a comparison, we also provide
the basic statistics for a large-scale survey that was conducted by the National Bureau of
8Statistics as a benchmark.3 In column 1, we report the mean of all of the variables for
identical twins. Fifty-nine percent of these identical twins were male who, on average, were
34 years old, had 12 years of schooling, and their spouses also had an average of 12 years of
schooling. Twenty-two percent of them were Party members who, on average, had worked
for 14 years and had monthly earnings of 912 yuan, where earnings include wages, bonuses,
and subsidies. The individuals in the identical twins sample were younger and earned less
than those in the National Bureau of Statistics sample. Finally, the individuals in the non-
twins sample (column 3) were older than both those in the National Bureau of Statistics
sample and those in the twins samples.
To obtain a well performing within-twin-pair estimation of the returns to Party mem-
bership, the within-twin-pair variation of Party membership must be suﬃciently large. We
check the within-twin-pair variations in Party membership and education by reporting their
distributions (Table 2). In 66 percent of the sets of identical twins neither twin was a Party
member, in 24 percent one of the twins was a Party member, and in 10 percent both twins
were Party members. The within-twin-pair variation in education is even larger. Fifty-three
percent of the twin pairs had the same education, 10 percent had one year’s diﬀerence in
education, about 10 percent had two years’ diﬀerence, and the remaining 27 percent had a
diﬀerence of more than two years.
4 Results
In this section, we report the estimated returns to Party membership using the diﬀerent
samples and methods. We start with OLS regressions using the whole sample, which includes
twins and non-twins, and then conduct the same OLS estimations using the monozygotic
twins sample to compare the estimated coeﬃcients to those that are estimated using the
whole sample. This comparison serves as a way to check the representativeness of the
monozygotic twins sample. We then conduct the within-twin-pair ﬁxed-eﬀects and GLS
3The National Bureau of Statistics has been conducting an annual survey of urban households from 226
cities (counties) in China since 1986. It is the best large-scale survey of this kind.
9estimations using the twins sample, leaving the sensitivity analyses to the next section.
4.1 OLS Regressions Using the Whole Sample
In Table 3, we report the results of the OLS regressions using the whole sample that includes
both twins and non-twins. The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly earnings.
The t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors.
Column 1 shows a simple regression with the Party membership dummy and city
dummies as independent variables. This simple regression shows that the returns to Party
membership are quite large: being a Party member increases earnings by 26.2 percent, which
is precisely estimated with a t-statistic of 11.36.
When we add other control variables, such as age, age squared, gender, and tenure in
the second column, the correlation between the Party membership dummy and log earnings
remains signiﬁcant. The estimated coeﬃcient decreases by only 2.2 percentage points, which
suggests that omitting these variables only results in a small positive bias. These newly
added control variables in column 2 also have the expected signs. Men have 17.4 percent
higher earnings than women, and there is a concave relationship between income and age.
The positive coeﬃcient of age and the negative coeﬃcient of age squared are both signiﬁcant
at least at the 10-percent level. Wage increases with age before the age of 29 and starts to
drop thereafter. The turning point occurs at such a young age because we also control for
job tenure, which generally increases with age. Job tenure itself has a positive eﬀect, with
an additional year in a post increasing earnings by 0.8 percent.
In column 3, we add the important human capital variable of education as a covariate.
Controlling for education, the eﬀect of Party membership is reduced by more than half.
This suggests that Party members are generally better educated than non-Party members,
and half of the eﬀect of the Party membership in column 2 is in fact due to the eﬀect of
education. As expected, education itself has a positive eﬀect on earnings. An additional
year of education increases earnings by 6.3 percent, which is comparable to the estimated
returns to education in previous studies that draw on Chinese data (Zhang et al., 2005).
10We then test whether Party membership has a positive impact on earnings because
Party members are more likely to become government oﬃcials. Morduch and Sicular (2000)
ﬁnd that much of the Party eﬀect can be explained by a government oﬃcial dummy in a
sample from rural China. In column 4, we include a new covariate, the government oﬃcial
dummy, that equals one if the respondent worked in the government or Party agency, and
zero otherwise. Including the government oﬃcial dummy reduces the coeﬃcient of the Party
membership dummy by only 0.2 percentage points, and the government oﬃcial dummy
itself is not signiﬁcant even at the 10-percent level. These ﬁndings suggest that becoming a
government oﬃcial may not be the major mechanism by which Party members earn more.
4.2 OLS Regressions Using the MZ Twins Sample
In this subsection, we repeat the same OLS regressions using the monozygotic twins sample.
Comparing the OLS results of the whole sample with those of the MZ twins sample is a way
of checking the representativeness of our twins sample. As we only use MZ twins, the sample
size is reduced to 870 (or 435 pairs of twins).
The regression results that are reported in Table 4 suggest that our MZ twins sample
is fairly representative in terms of the estimated coeﬃcients, which for most of the variables
are very similar to those that are reported in Table 3. This is especially true for the Party
membership dummy. Note that the coeﬃcient that is reported in column 4 is 0.112, which
is only slightly diﬀerent from that reported in column 4 of Table 3. Another important
variable, education, also has a similar eﬀect to that estimated using the whole sample.
To summarize, the OLS estimates of the Party membership eﬀect are rather large even
after we control many of the covariates. The remaining eﬀect of Party membership is 0.112 in
column 4 of Table 4. However, we still do not know how much of this eﬀect is the real Party
membership eﬀect, such as political connections or the job privileges that are associated with
Party membership, and how much is due to unobserved ability or family background. The
ﬁnding that the government oﬃcial dummy cannot explain much of the remaining Party
membership eﬀect seems to suggest that political connections or job privileges may not be
11that important, but we need to make further investigations to show this more rigorously.
4.3 Within-Twin-Pair Estimations
In Table 5, we report the results of the within-twin-pair ﬁxed-eﬀects estimations, or the
estimations of Equation (4). As MZ twins have the same age and gender, these two variables
are dropped when assessing the ﬁrst diﬀerence.
The within-twin-pair estimation shows that much of the Party membership eﬀect that
is found in the OLS estimations is a result of the eﬀects of ability or family background.
Note that the within-twin-pair estimates of the Party membership dummy are all smaller
than the OLS estimates that are reported in Table 4. Taking column 4 of Table 5 as an
example, it can be seen that the Party eﬀect is only 0.014, which is only one eighth of the OLS
estimate using the same twins sample. This suggests that seven eighths of the OLS estimate
of the Party eﬀect is actually due to the eﬀects of ability or family background. Moreover,
none of the estimated coeﬃcients on the Party dummy in the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimations is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, which suggests that after removing the eﬀects of ability and
family background, the pure Party membership eﬀect is zero.4
It is also interesting to compare the within-twin-pair estimates of other variables to the
OLS estimates. The estimated eﬀect of job tenure remains insigniﬁcant, as in Table 4. The
returns to education diminish from 0.071 to 0.024, which shows that the OLS estimate of
the returns to education is also biased upward by about 200 percent. Finally, the coeﬃcient
of the government oﬃcial dummy becomes larger after controlling for the eﬀects of ability
and family background, but is not signiﬁcant at a conventional level.
4One concern is simultaneity, that is, that those with higher earnings are more likely to join (or be
selected by) the Party. In terms of the within-twin-pair estimations, simultaneity means that in a given
pair of twins the twin with higher earnings is more likely to join the Party. If simultaneity is important in
our twins sample, then this reverse causality would lead to a positive correlation between the within-twin-
pair diﬀerence in the Party membership and the within-twin-pair diﬀerence in earnings, and would cause
the estimated eﬀect of the Party membership on earnings to become biased upward. However, we ﬁnd the
within-twin-pair estimate of the Party eﬀect to be zero, which suggests that any upward bias that is caused
by simultaneity, even if does exist, is not very important.
124.4 GLS Estimations Using Twins
We next turn to the GLS estimator for Equations (6) and (7), which can directly estimate
both the Party membership eﬀect and the ability or family eﬀect. In Table 6, we report
the GLS estimates that include all of the covariates that are used in the OLS estimates. In
addition to the Party membership dummy, we also include the sum of the Party membership
dummies of both twins in a pair (P1i + P2i) as an independent variable. The coeﬃcient of
this new variable will be the estimated eﬀect of ability or family background, that is, γ
in Equations (6) and (7). Similarly, we also include the sums of education, tenure and
government oﬃcial dummies as covariates to estimate the family eﬀect of these variables.
The GLS model is estimated by stacking Equations (6) and (7) and ﬁtting them using the
SURE model.
The GLS estimations again show that the pure Party eﬀect is small and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, whereas the eﬀects of omitted ability and family background are large.
The coeﬃcient of an individual’s Party membership is only 0.014-0.049, which is very close
to the within-twin-pair estimates. In contrast, the estimated family eﬀect, that is, the
coeﬃcient of the sum of the Party membership dummy of both twins in a pair, is much
larger than the pure Party eﬀect and is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in most cases. The
result for education is also consistent with that of the within-twin-pair estimates. There is a
large family eﬀect for education, but education remains signiﬁcant in the earnings equation
even after we remove the family eﬀect.
5 Sensitivity Tests
In this section, we conduct a series of sensitivity tests on the within-twin-pair estimations.
We ﬁrst apply a simple correlation test to examine whether the within-twin-pair estimates
are less biased than the OLS estimates. We then employ the Heckman correction model to
test whether our results are aﬀected by the sample selection. Finally, we test whether the
Party eﬀect diﬀers between the older and younger generations.
135.1 Potential Biases of Within-Twin-Pair Estimates
The major concern of the within-twin-pair estimate is whether it is less biased than the
OLS estimate, and therefore a better estimate (Bound and Solon, 1999; Neumark, 1999).
Bound and Solon (1999) examine the implications of the endogenous determination of which
twin goes to school for longer, and conclude that twins-based estimations are vulnerable to
the same sort of bias that aﬀects conventional cross-sectional estimations. They argue that
although taking a within-twin-pair diﬀerence removes genetic variation, or µi, from Equation
(4), this diﬀerence may still reﬂect the ability bias to the extent that ability consists of
more than just genes. In other words, a within-twin-pair estimation may not completely
eliminate the bias of the conventional cross-sectional estimation, because the within-twin-
pair diﬀerence in ability may remain in 1i − 2i in Equation (4), which may correlate with
P1i − P2i. If endogenous variation in the Party membership variable comprises as large
a proportion of the remaining within-twin-pair variation as it does of the cross-sectional
variation, then a within-twin-pair estimation is subject to as large an endogeneity bias as
the cross-sectional estimator.
Although within-twin-pair estimation cannot completely eliminate the bias of the OLS
estimator, it can tighten the upper bound of the return on Party membership. Ashenfelter
and Rouse (1998), Bound and Solon (1999), and Neumark (1999) have all debated the bias
in the OLS and within-twin-pair estimations at length. Note that the bias in the OLS
estimator depends on the fraction of variance in the Party membership that is accounted
for by the variance in unobserved ability that may also aﬀect earnings, that is,
cov(Pi,µi+i)
var(Pi) .
Similarly, the bias that ability causes in the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator depends on the fraction of
within-twin-pair variance in the Party membership that is accounted for by the within-twin-
pair variance in unobserved ability that also aﬀects earnings, that is,
cov(∆Pi,∆µi+∆i)
var(∆Pi) . If we
are conﬁdent that Party membership and the earnings error term are positively correlated
both in the cross-sectional and within-twin-pair regressions, and if the endogenous variation
within a family is smaller than the endogenous variation between families, then we can take
14it that the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator is less biased than the OLS estimator. Thus, even if there
is an ability bias in the within-twin-pair regressions, the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator can still
be regarded as an upper bound of the return on Party membership (if Party membership
and ability are positively correlated). If this is the case, we can credit the within-twin-pair
estimates for having tightened the upper bound of the return on Party membership. From
this point of view, comparing monozygotic twins serves the purpose of reducing the bias in
the estimation of returns to Party membership.
To examine whether the within-twin-pair estimate is less biased than the OLS estimate,
we follow Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) and conduct some correlation analyses. We use the
correlations of average family Party membership over each pair of twins with the average
family characteristics that may be correlated with ability (for example, education, tenure,
marital status, spouse’s education, and birth weight) to indicate the expected ability bias
in a cross-sectional OLS regression. We then use the correlations of the within-twin-pair
diﬀerence in Party membership and the within-twin-pair diﬀerences in these characteristics
to indicate the expected ability bias in a within-twin-pair regression. If the correlations in the
cross-sectional case are larger than those in the within-twin-pair case, then the ability bias
in the cross-sectional OLS regressions is likely to be larger than that in the within-twin-pair
regressions.
The correlation tests that are reported in Table 7 suggest that the within-twin-pair
estimations of the returns to Party membership may indeed be less aﬀected by omitted
variables than the OLS estimations. Note that the between-family correlations are all larger
in magnitude than the within-twin-pair correlations. For example, the correlation between
average family Party membership and average family education is 0.25 (column 1, row 1)
and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, which suggests that families with a lower average level
of education have fewer Party members. This is consistent with the assumption that ability
and family background positively aﬀect Party membership status. The correlation of within-
twin-pair diﬀerence in Party membership and the within-twin-pair diﬀerence in education
15is less than half that of the between-family correlation. This suggests that, to the extent
that education measures ability, within-twin-pair diﬀerences in Party membership are less
aﬀected by the ability bias than the family-average of Party membership variable. However,
this within-twin-pair correlation is still statistically signiﬁcant and large in magnitude, which
implies that the within-twin-pair diﬀerence cannot completely eliminate the ability bias that
is embodied in education. Thus, it is necessary to control for the within-twin-pair diﬀerence
in education in the within-twin-pair estimations of the returns to Party membership.
The correlations of Party membership with other variables provide even stronger ev-
idence that the within-twin-pair estimations are subject to a smaller omitted ability bias.
The between-family correlations are signiﬁcant in all but one of these pairs, but none of
the within-twin-pair correlations is signiﬁcant. Of course, these characteristics are only an
incomplete set of ability measures, but the evidence is suggestive.
5.2 Selection Bias
As in all studies that are concerned with earnings, there is a potential selection bias that is
caused by the decision to participate. Observations had to be dropped from our analysis if
there was no response on the earnings question from the interviewees, and it may be that
poor people were more likely to be dropped because they would be less likely to be prepared
to answer this question. If they are also less likely to be Party members, then the sample
selection may lead to an underestimation of the Party membership coeﬃcient.
To address this problem, we employ the Heckman-correction model using the dummy
for reporting earnings (1 = reported, 0 = not reported) in the participation equation. For
the within-twin-pair estimations to work, we need both twins to have reported their income
in the questionnaire. Thus, there are two selection rules. To deal with this double selection
problem, we follow Tunali (1986) and Bonjour et al. (2003) and estimate a bivariate probit
model for the participation of both twins. We use age, marital status, and the number of
children as additional determinants of selection. Subject to identiﬁability,5 the estimations
5Generally speaking, it is hard to ﬁnd very compelling instruments. Thus, as in other twins studies (e.g.,
16that are made using the bivariate probit model to correct selection bias will yield consistent
estimates of the Party eﬀect.
Table 8 reports the within-twin-pair estimates with the Heckman corrections using the
double selection model. Similar to the within-twin-pair estimates that are reported in Table
5, the estimated Party eﬀects are all close to zero and none is signiﬁcant. One of the selection
terms is marginally signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst two regressions, but becomes insigniﬁcant once
we include education and other controls in columns 3 and 4. These results therefore suggest
that selection bias is not a critical issue in our twins sample.
5.3 Old versus Young Workers
Although the Communist Party still rules China, the communist ideology and the role of the
Party and government in the economy have weakened after more than two and half decades
of economic transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. The most important
change in this period has been the entrance of non-state ﬁrms, including private, collective,
and foreign ﬁrms, into the economy. In 2002, the non-state sector employed 70 percent of
workers in China, and produced two thirds of the GDP.
These changes to the economy and the weakening of the communist ideology aﬀect
both the returns to Party membership and Party member selection. The non-state sector
may not value Party membership as much as the state sector, and thus if young people
are more likely to enter the non-state sector, then the returns to Party membership will be
smaller for the younger generation than for the older generation. Equally, the weakening of
the communist ideology and declining economic returns may have made joining the Party
less attractive for the younger generation, and thus young people with a high level of ability
may be less likely to join the Party than the older generation.
The unobserved ability or selection eﬀect may also be more important for the older
generation for historical reasons. As is well known, the Cultural Revolution, which occurred
between 1966 and 1976, interrupted the education and career of many Chinese who were born
Bonjour et al., 2003), the Heckman-correction model may only be suggestive.
17between 1950 and 1968 (aged 34-52 at the time of the survey in 2002). As a result, education
and job experience may not fully pick up the ability of these people, and furthermore the
political fever in this period understandably made joining the Party very rewarding for
individuals with great ability.
We next test whether the returns to Party membership and the selection eﬀect (the
eﬀect of observed and unobserved ability) diﬀer for the older and younger generations. As
our dataset is cross-sectional in nature, the best way to test this is to divide the sample into
younger and older generations. The dividing point for the two generations is the median age
in the sample, 34, which happens to be the cutoﬀ age for individuals whose education was
interrupted by the Cultural Revolution.
The regression results show that the younger and older generations diﬀer only in the
selection eﬀect. In Table 9, we report the OLS and within-twin-pair estimations of the returns
to Party membership using a sample of old twins. Note that the Party membership dummy
is positive and signiﬁcant at the one-percent level for all of the OLS speciﬁcations (columns
1-4). The magnitudes of the coeﬃcient of all four speciﬁcations are larger than those that
are estimated using twins from both the old and young generations (Table 4). Interestingly,
once we take the within-twin-pair diﬀerence, almost all of the Party membership eﬀect is
gone. The coeﬃcients of the Party membership dummy are insigniﬁcant and very small in
magnitude for all the within-twin-pair estimations (columns 5-8), which suggests that Party
members in the older generation tend to have a higher unobserved ability than non-party
members, and there are no returns to Party membership per se.
The regression results for the young sample that are reported in Table 10 suggest a
diﬀerent story. Although young Party members enjoy some earnings premium, the whole
premium can be explained by observed human capital variables, such as education, age, and
tenure. Although the Party membership dummy is signiﬁcant in the simple regression in
column 1, the magnitude is much smaller than that for the old sample (0.175 versus 0.332),
and becomes insigniﬁcant after we control for other variables in column 2. Once we include
18education as a covariate in columns 3 and 4, the coeﬃcient of the Party membership dummy
becomes almost zero, which suggests that young Party members earn more than other young
people because they are more experienced, and in particular are better educated. Again, the
within-twin-pair estimates of the Party membership dummy in columns 5-8 are insigniﬁcant.
Interestingly, although the old and young samples diﬀer in unobserved ability, the
returns to education and other observable human capital variables are almost the same. The
returns to education for both samples are around 0.70 for the OLS estimates, and around
0.21-0.29 for the within-twin pair estimates, although only the OLS estimates are statistically
signiﬁcant. Comparing column 1 and column 4 in each of the two tables, we ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcient of the Party membership dummy has decreased by almost the same amount (0.16)
for the old and young samples when other human capital variables are controlled for. This
suggests that these human capital variables, which include education, can explain the same
portion of the earnings premium that is associated with Party membership, and, in the case
of the young sample, the portion that is explained by these variables comprises almost the
whole premium.
In summary, we ﬁnd that Party members on average enjoy an earnings premium in both
the older and the younger generations, although it is larger for the older generation. The
earnings premium for the younger generation can be fully explained by the better observable
human capital variables, such as age, tenure, and education. The earnings premium for the
older generation cannot be fully explained by such variables, but it can be fully explained
by unobserved ability. The diﬀerence in the eﬀect of unobserved ability may be due to
the interrupted education of the older generation or the declining attractiveness of Party
membership over time.6
6An alternative explanation of the results is that the returns to the unobservables increase with age.
Although we cannot exclude this explanation, we do ﬁnd that the returns to observables, which include
education and other human capital variables, do not diﬀer across the young and old samples.
196 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically measure the returns to membership of the Chinese Communist
Party. By using twins data to control for the eﬀects of omitted ability and family background,
we ﬁnd that most of the eﬀect of Party membership is actually due to these eﬀects. Our
sensitivity analyses suggest that the within-twin-pair estimates can at least serve as the
upper bound of the true returns to Party membership, and in our case this upper bound is
almost zero. The estimations are also robust to models that control for selection bias. The
ﬁnding that most of the eﬀect of Party membership is due to unobserved ability or family
background is not surprising, as the unique way in which the Party selects its members
ensures their superior quality.
When we conduct the same analysis on the older and younger generations separately,
we ﬁnd that the earnings premium that is associated with Party membership for the younger
generation can be fully explained by their better observable human capital variables, such
as age, tenure, and education. The earnings premium for the older generation cannot be
fully explained by such variables, but it can be fully explained by unobserved ability. The
diﬀerence in the eﬀect of unobserved ability may be due to the interrupted education of the
older generation or the declining attractiveness of Party membership over time.
An interesting question is whether Party members have used their unique political
status to exploit non-Party members and become rich during China’s economic transition.
Although we do not deny that this may have happened, and indeed there is some anecdotal
evidence to suggest that many Party members are actually corrupt, our ﬁndings suggest that
after controlling for the eﬀects of ability and family background Party membership confers
no beneﬁt, at least in terms of tangible labor earnings. We have to admit that, like any
other studies in the literature of economics, sociology, and political science, we are not able
to measure intangible income, such as bribes. However, our study still provides important
evidence that the literature on the returns to Communist Party membership should be re-
evaluated, because it is completely based on the OLS estimates of the Party premium. We
20ﬁnd that the whole premium is simply a premium of ability.
The survival of communism in China depends on the Party, and the survival of the
Party depends on the quality of its members. Our analysis shows that Party members gen-
erally have a higher ability than non-Party members, either in the form of easily observable
human capital variables or in the form of unobservables. The high quality of Party mem-
bers explains why they have been able to quickly come up with and eﬀectively implement
market-based reforms, and why they are able to constantly adapt to the new environment
but keep the communist ideology alive (although the ideology may have weakened in the
younger generation). In this sense, the fact that its members are China’s elite may be an
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Twins and Non-Twins Samples 












       
Party membership  0.22    0.20  0.29  -- 
  (0.42) (0.40) (0.45)  -- 
       
Age 33.99    34.10  42.22  40.80 
  (9.27) (9.33) (8.39)  (11.98) 
       
Male 0.59  0.60  0.47  0.55 
  (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)  (0.50) 
       
Tenure (number of years working full time  14.33  14.33  21.68  18.45 
      since  age  16)  (9.67)  (9.67)  (9.05)  (12.94) 
       
Earnings (monthly wage, bonus and subsidies  912.06    877.96  848.47  1062.92 
          in  RMB)  (515.79)  (573.73)  (551.08)  (840.09) 
       
Years of education  12.43    12.07  11.76  11.62 
  (2.87) (2.92) (3.06)  (2.83) 
       
Spouse’s education  11.82    11.53  11.51  -- 
  (3.08) (3.10) (3.49)  -- 
       
Government official    0.07  0.07  0.10  0.09 
  (0.26) (0.25) (0.30)  (0.18) 
       
Sample size  870  1852  1260  23288 
Note: Mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) are reported in the table.  For the MZ twins sample, we 
restrict the sample to those twin pairs, (435 pairs) for which we have complete information of wages, Party 
membership, years of education, job tenure, and the government official status on both twins in the pair. For DZ 
twins and non-twins, we restrict the sample to those individuals that have complete information.  The NBS 
sample is based on six provinces.  25
Table 2: Within-Twin Pair Differences in the Party Membership and Education (435 twin pairs) 
  No. of Observations  Proportion (%) 
Within-twin-pair difference in Party membership   
Neither twin is Party Member  286  65.7 
Either is Party Member  103  23.7 
Both are Party Members  46  10.6 
Total   435  100 
    
Within-twin-pair difference in education 
0 232  53.3 
1 44  10.1 
2 42  9.7 
3-8 117  26.9 
Total 435  100 
  26
Table 3: OLS Estimates of the Return to the Party Membership Using the Whole Sample 
  Dependent variable: log earnings 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Party membership  0.262***  0.240***  0.119***  0.117*** 
 (11.36)  (10.20)  (5.10)  (4.96) 
        
Age   0.020**  0.017*  0.017* 
   (2.10)  (1.95)  (1.96) 
        
Age-squared   -0.034***  -0.029***  -0.029*** 
   (3.00)  (2.74)  (2.74) 
        
Male   0.174***  0.195***  0.195*** 
   (7.89)  (9.47)  (9.46) 
        
Tenure   0.008**  0.012***  0.012*** 
   (2.55)  (4.25)  (4.24) 
        
Years of education      0.063***  0.062*** 
     (18.16)  (17.47) 
        
Government official        0.023 
       (0.64) 
        
Constant  6.600*** 6.154*** 5.372***  5.374*** 
 (335.74)  (34.94)  (31.66)  (31.57) 
        
Observations  3112 3112 3112  3112 
R-squared  0.06 0.08 0.18  0.18 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
All  regressions  include  city  dummies.         27
Table 4: OLS Estimates of the Return to the Party Membership Using the MZ twins Sample   
  Dependent variable: log earnings 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Party membership  0.281***  0.251***  0.114**  0.112** 
  (6.18) (5.19) (2.45)  (2.38) 
        
Age   0.074***  0.045**  0.045** 
   (3.59)  (2.37)  (2.38) 
        
Age-squared   -0.081***  -0.053**  -0.054** 
   (3.02)  (2.12)  (2.13) 
        
Male   0.168***  0.192***  0.191*** 
   (3.87)  (4.86)  (4.81) 
        
Tenure   -0.011  0.003  0.003 
   (1.37)  (0.52)  (0.50) 
        
Years of education      0.071***  0.071*** 
     (11.48)  (11.24) 
        
Government official        0.032 
       (0.57) 
        
Constant  6.627*** 5.190*** 4.772***  4.772*** 
 (102.49)  (14.31)  (13.96)  (13.95) 
        
Twin  pairs  435 435 435  435 
Observations  870 870 870  870 
R-squared 0.06  0.11  0.23  0.23 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
All  regressions  include  city  dummies.        
  28
Table 5: Within-Twin-Pair Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Return to the Party Membership Using the MZ 
twins Sample 
  Dependent variable: log earnings 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Party membership  0.049  0.046  0.033  0.014 
  (0.95) (0.88) (0.63)  (0.27) 
        
Tenure   0.010  0.014  0.013 
   (0.88)  (1.17)  (1.14) 
        
Years of education      0.026*  0.024* 
     (1.79)  (1.66) 
        
Government official        0.136 
       (1.64) 
        
Twin  pairs  435 435 435  435 
Observations  870 870 870  870 
R-squared  0.00 0.00 0.02  0.02 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  29
Table 6: GLS Estimates of the Return to the Party Membership Using the MZ twins Sample 
  Dependent variable: log earnings 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Party membership  0.049  0.045  0.032  0.014 
  (0.98) (0.91) (0.65)  (0.28) 
        
Sum of Party membership dummies  0.179***  0.164***  0.065  0.075* 
  (4.47) (4.05) (1.64)  (1.87) 
        
Age   0.077***  0.045***  0.045*** 
   (4.30)  (2.72)  (2.70) 
        
Age-squared   -0.080***  -0.049**  -0.049** 
   (3.38)  (2.27)  (2.26) 
        
Male   0.157***  0.189***  0.189*** 
   (3.57)  (4.76)  (4.76) 
        
Tenure   0.011  0.015  0.014 
   (1.07)  (1.42)  (1.38) 
        
Years of education      0.027**  0.024** 
     (2.22)  (2.02) 
        
Sum of twin-pair’s education      0.025***  0.026*** 
     (3.52)  (3.68) 
        
Government agencies        0.135* 
       (1.73) 
        
Sum of government dummies        -0.079 
       (1.33) 
        
Constant  6.582*** 5.091*** 4.670***  4.670*** 
 (111.01)  (15.44)  (15.54)  (15.54) 
        
Twin  pairs  435 435 435  435 
Observations  870 870 870  870 
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions include city dummies.  30
Table 7: Between-Families and Within-Twin-Pair Correlations of the Party Membership and Other 
Variables (435 twin pairs) 
        
Between-family correlations    Within-Twin-Pair Correlations 
 Party  membership      ∆Party membership 
Education 0.2458***    ∆Education 0.1150** 
 (<0.01)      (0.02) 
        
Tenure 0.3347***    ∆Tenure 0.0649 
 (<0.01)      (0.18) 
        
Spouse’s education  0.1816***    ∆Spouse’s education  -0.0227 
 (<0.01)      (0.73) 
        
Marital status  0.2232***    ∆Marital status  -0.0318 
 (<0.01)      (0.51) 
        
Birth weight  -0.0350    ∆Birth weight  -0.0061 
 (0.4692)      (0.90) 
Note: Significant level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
Between-family correlation are correlations of average family Party membership (average of the twins) 
with average family characteristics, and within-twin-pair correlations are correlations of the 
within-twin-pair differences in education with within-twin-pair differences in other characteristics  31
Table 8: Heckman-Corrected Fixed-Effect Model Using MZ Twins 
  Dependent variable: log earnings 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Party membership  0.040  0.036  0.031  0.013 
 (0.79)  (0.69)  (0.61)  (0.25) 
        
Tenure   0.013  0.014  0.013 
   (1.09)  (1.15)  (1.13) 
        
Years of education      0.017  0.013 
     (0.74)  (0.62) 
        
Government official        0.136 
       (1.63) 
        
Heckman selection term 1  -0.351*  -0.378*  -0.193  -0.206 
 (1.79)  (1.95)  (0.65)  (0.70) 
        
Heckman selection term 2  0.326  0.354  0.144  0.161 
 (1.38)  (1.51)  (0.41)  (0.46) 
        
Twin Pairs  434  434  434  434 
Observations 868  868  868  868 
R-squared 0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses.    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. We use age, marital status, and the number of children as instrumental variables for the selection 




Table 9: OLS and Within-Twin-Pair Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Return to the Party Membership Using the Old MZ 
Twins Sample (age greater than the median 34) 
  Dependent variable: log earnings 
 OLS    Within-twin-pair 
fixed-effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Party  membership  0.332*** 0.339*** 0.183*** 0.173***   0.041  0.038 0.026 -0.012 
  (5.97) (5.80) (3.29) (3.07)   (0.51)  (0.48) (0.33) (0.15) 
                
Age    0.060 0.031 0.034           
    (0.65) (0.38) (0.41)           
                
Age-squared    -0.062 -0.035 -0.038          
    (0.58) (0.37) (0.40)           
                
Male    0.152**  0.177***  0.175***         
    (2.42) (3.03) (3.00)           
                
Tenure    -0.012  0.001  0.001      0.008 0.012 0.012 
    (1.17) (0.11) (0.08)     (0.60)  (0.91)  (0.87) 
                
Years of education      0.071***  0.069***        0.029  0.025 
     (8.29)  (8.00)        (1.36)  (1.22) 
                
Government official        0.074          0.185* 
       (1.12)          (1.71) 
                
Constant  6.609*** 5.366*** 5.011*** 4.972***           
  (72.66)  (2.70) (2.86) (2.83)           
                
Twin  pairs         203  203  203  203 
Observations  406 406 406 406    406  406  406  406 
R-squared  0.09 0.12 0.25 0.25   0.00  0.00 0.02 0.03 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
regressions include city dummies.    33
Table 10: OLS and Within-Twin-Pair Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Return to the Party Membership Using the Young 
MZ Twins Sample (age less than the median 34) 
  Dependent variable: log earnings 
 OLS    Within-twin-pair 
fixed-effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Party membership  0.175**  0.107  0.013 0.013    0.061  0.057  0.042  0.040 
  (2.12) (1.36) (0.17) (0.17)   (1.19)  (1.07)  (0.77) (0.73) 
                
Age   0.172*  0.062  0.060           
    (1.71) (0.63) (0.61)           
                
Age-squared    -0.259 -0.080 -0.077          
    (1.32) (0.42) (0.41)           
                
Male    0.181*** 0.204*** 0.206***           
    (2.88) (3.55) (3.54)           
                
Tenure   -0.007  0.006  0.006      0.014  0.017  0.017 
    (0.47) (0.53) (0.54)     (0.65)  (0.74)  (0.74) 
                
Years of education      0.070***  0.071***        0.022  0.021 
     (7.82)  (7.75)        (1.12)  (1.08) 
                
Government official        -0.032          0.062 
       (0.36)          (0.49) 
                
Constant  6.648*** 3.898*** 4.577*** 4.595***           
  (71.63)  (3.13) (3.72) (3.73)           
                
Twin  pairs         232  232  232  232 
Observations  464 464 464 464    464  464  464  464 
R-squared 0.03  0.11  0.22  0.22    0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
regressions include city dummies.   